

Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation (CASPOD)

Proposed
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

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DTRA/CB

What is CASPOD?

Chem / Bio Defense (CBD) technologies and procedures for pre/during/post attack actions necessary to protect against and immediately react to the consequences of a Chem Bio attack at Seaports of Debarkation.

As a minimum it will include:

- Protection for personnel and critical equipment prior to attack including Host Nation assets
- CB attack detection/identification/warning
- Personnel and personal equipment decontamination
- Contamination mapping
- Decontamination of critical equipment/facilities necessary to restore and sustain port operations
- Deployable/Networked system of sensors for improved situational awareness
- Limit the effects on OPTEMPO and degradation of Force Flow



WMD Threat to Power Projection Operations

US National Security Strategy '00

... the United States must be prepared to fight and win where *asymmetric means* are used against us
Such as **WMD ...used to disrupt the critical logistics pipeline** - from its origins in the United States ...to its termination **at ...seaports ... in theater.**

Joint Vision 2020 '00

"**asymmetrical** [attack] is ... the **most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future** . . . the US must **maintain its ability to rapidly project power worldwide** in order to achieve full spectrum dominance."

Director DIA '99

"The ... proliferation of [WMD] ... has become the **greatest direct threat to U.S. forces deployed ... states see WMD as their best chance to preclude U.S. force options.**"

WMD represents
a direct threat to
US Power
Projection Operations



Rumsfeld Commission '98

"...countries with regional ambitions do not welcome the U.S. role as a stabilizing power...they want to **place restraints on the U.S. capability to project power...They see the acquisition of ...WMD technology as a way of doing so.**"

DSB '99

[Potential Adversaries]... "will...capitalize on **U.S. forces' near-absolute reliance on unimpeded access to and use of ports** in the theater of conflict"

CASPOD ACTD Sponsorship

- “U.S. Central Command wants to sponsor or co-sponsor this effort with U.S. Pacific Command or U.S. Transportation Command.”

Maj Gen Renuart J-3 US Central Command letter



- “I fully support your proposal for the CASPOD ACTD and would like to be identified as a co-sponsoring CINC...”

RADM Fahy J-5 US Transportation Command letter



- PACOM wants to sponsor the CASPOD ACTD and will forward a letter to DTRA to that effect.

Brig Gen Johns, Dep J-5 U.S. Pacific Command during meeting 13 Jun 2001



CASPOD Key Players

- **CINC Sponsor**
 - Central Command (Sponsor or Co-Sponsor)
 - Pacific Command (Sponsor or Co-Sponsor)
 - Transportation Command (Supporting CINC)
- **Executing Agent**
 - DTRA
- **Operational Manger**
 - Central Command or Pacific Command
- **Technical Manager**
 - DTRA
- **Lead Service**
 - Army
- **Technical Test Evaluator**
 - West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Grounds
- **Operational Test Evaluator**
 - Army Test and Evaluation Center


Mina Salaman,
Bahrain
- Proposed OCONUS
Demonstration Site -



MOT Concord, CA
or
MOT Sunny Point, NC
- Proposed CONUS
Demonstration Sites -

SPOD CB Defense Challenge

Minimize degradation to OPTEMPO & Force Flow resulting from CB attack during *vulnerable initial force deployment* period of contingency operations at SPODs



Typical Fixed Sites

- Mature theater
- US controlled installation
- US Military Presence
- CBD Equipment in-place
- Robust C² Infrastructure
- Established CONOPs, TTPs
- Established Command Relationships

Majority of SPODs

- Immature Theater
- Foreign owned / controlled facility
- No US Military Presence
- No CBD Equipment in-place
- No C² Infrastructure
- Ill-defined CONOPs, TTPs
- Ill-defined Command Relationships


**Counter "Access Denial" Strategy provide
"Access Assurance" for Power
Projection Operations**

CASPOD Objectives

- Develop & Demonstrate resident, pre-positioned, or rapidly transportable CBD materiel packages for SPOD detection, protection, decontamination, & restoration
- Demonstrate technologies & tools to mitigate effects of CB attack on SPODs during power projection operations
- Demonstrate operational concepts & tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) for restoring operations at SPODs
- Identify improvement / shortfalls in current US Policy for OCONUS CASPOD contingencies

Mitigate effects of CB attack, maintain power projection OPTEMPO & force flow at SPODs

Literature Analysis



Updating literature analysis with recent exercises and other studies


Port Operations & Infrastructure

Command Centers

MTMC
 MSC
 Service Component(s)
 Port Authority



Command and Control



Ship Handling Opns

Cargo Load/Unload Opns including Longshoreman / Stevedore IPE



Cargo / Vehicle Staging Marshalling, Protection, & Decon Opns



Cargo Tranship Opns


Medical Support



Warehouse Operations



Noncombatant Evacuation Opns




Host Nation Support Including HN / TCN IPE

RSOI Operations



Security Operations



TPFDD Flow

Cargo & Equipment
 Throughput

Personnel Reception, Staging,
 Onward Movement and Integration

Technology Focus Areas

DETECTION




PROTECTION



MEDICAL



SITUATIONAL AWARENESS



**Deployable C2 System
Leverage CRASOC2**

DECON

